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EU Relations with the IMF 
 
Dr Amber Yeoh 
 
 
The external representation of the euro, particularly within the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), is certainly complex. It has been the subject of doctrinal and political positions since the 
Single Act  recognized a monetary capacity for the European Community (EC); it is now gaining 
momentum, especially in view of the quota adjustment undertaken by the IMF. The issue goes far 
beyond the seemingly technical aspects of the euro area's integration into the IMF. It is, in fact, 
a central aspect of Europe's place in the new world order, characterized by the birth of a new 
equilibrium: the crisis of identity of a superpower, the rise in strength of so-called emerging 
countries, the de-legitimization of the G7 and the construction of a new Europe. This is the 
meaning of the title of a recent contribution by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Powerless Europe: Why is 
the Euro Area still a political Dwarf? That such an appeal, which is not an alibi, as sometimes 
happens to central bankers quick to blame politics, comes from a member of the Executive Board 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) says a lot about the lack of imagination and, therefore, the 
initiative of the political leaders. What is at stake is  the European Union (EU) in general. 
 
Even if one refuses to see the implications for global governance of the issue that is being 
addressed, the current situation of fragmented representation cannot be considered satisfactory. 
The reasons for this situation are clear: to a large extent this is explained, as often, by the 
resistance of States to abandon the appearance of power and thus draw the consequences of the 
transfer of powers to the benefit of a common authority. But one knows that things are not so 
simple: the euro zone group of 13 Member States of the Union, or almost half of them on 1 
January 2007. The skills are not equally distributed among Member States and the Community in 
the field of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In addition, there are obstacles also on the 
side of external structures that should take into account the reality of the existence of monetary 
union. The IMF is a monetary and financial organization, based on Member States (country-
based) and not on currency (currency-based). The creation of a monetary union did not take 
away from the membership of the Fund Member States. The addition of European shares in the 
capital of the Fund, which determines the rights and obligations of its members, as regards 
drawdowns on the Fund and determines the voting rights, gives more than 31% of the votes to 
the European States.  
 
There is little doubt, as will be mentioned, that a regrouping of the shares of the Union or of the 
euro area would lead to the granting of a smaller overall quota than that which would result from 
the simple addition quotas of the Member States. A single representation, by changing the 
composition of the constituents (i.e. groups with the largest number of members of the Fund), 
would result in the loss of control of some of them to Member States of the Union. This should 
also be resolved question posed by the evolutionary composition of both the Union and the euro 
area. 
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All this and other reasons explain the stagnation that has prevailed so far, in the form of a kind of 
benign neglect or pragmatism in relations between the EC and the Fund, as well as informal 
groups, such as the G7 (G8) where large EU Member States continue to sit alongside the 
Common Representation. But it is also the role of external structures that is questioned. Its new 
architecture must take into account its future missions. Will it be an organization lending 
essentially of analysis and advice whose task would be reduced to the point of becoming 
insignificant? Or is this financial role promised for a potentially important future? 
 
In addition, making room for Europe improves the representation of emerging and developing 
countries. It is the system of participation in the Fund as a whole, with its outdated balances, 
which is in question. And what about the G7, whose role in the operation of the IMF was 
paramount, and who is, today, depreciated and condemned, in the long run, to powerlessness 
because its membership has become obsolete. And yet, it seems that things are moving. 
Certainly, still modestly if one looks at the decisions of the IMF Assembly in Singapore last 
September, in particular, the increase in quotas, and therefore the voting rights, of four countries: 
China, Korea South, Mexico and Turkey, but a process reform is now under way and both the 
quota calculation method and the respective weight of Fund members will have to be revised for 
2008. In addition, an advisory group has been set up. in place to ensure a multilateral 
surveillance procedure of a novel type, with the participation of the United States, the euro area, 
Japan, China and Saudi Arabia.  
. 
The Delors report on Economic and Monetary Union, which focuses of the Union's on the 
internal policies, refers only in an allusive way to international institutions. However, in the 
document (§37), a reference to the role of the EC in the "international monetary cooperation" and 
the other (§38), the claim that the Community should be able to speak with one voice at the 
"summits of the industrialized countries ", see Kirrane 2003. It was noted that in the Maastricht 
Treaty there is a reference express to the IMF only to Article 30 of the Protocol on the Statute of 
the System European of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB, concerning the transfer of foreign 
exchange reserves from the Member States to the ECB, in the case of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) and reserve positions on the IMF (non-transferable) and the quality of the ECB as SDR. 
holder However, Article 6 of the same statutes, relating to personality international legal, 
mentions the ECB's relations with international monetary institutions (by which the was meant 
Bank for International Settlements - BIS) and Article 23, devoted external operations of the 
Bank, provides for the possibility of relations with international organizations. 
 
In the Treaty itself, Article 111 (ex Article 109) is on external relations and applies only to 
Member States of the euro area, but paragraph 4, which could raise the issue of the IMF, has in 
general terms concerning the position of the Community "at international level" and the 
modalities of its representation, a paragraph purporting to replace Article 116 of the EEC Treaty 
with a similar purpose. It might have been expected that the Treaty, by assigning to the 
Community the objective of achieving a monetary union among its members, would have 
referred to the principles of the IMF, much like Article 131 refers to the principles of threshold 
of the chapter devoted to it, but this gap is explained by the fact that the IMF was considered 
more or less implicitly as the case of the States and not of the Community. Amongst the Member 
States, there appeared to be a preference for the status quo, especially since the Monetary 
Committee had concluded that out of all the decisions within the competence of the Fund's Board 
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of Directors, only 5% apposition common at Community level. The IMF staff had no reason to 
take an initiative in this regard and could camp on its analysis of the Fund's Articles and the 
rights they confer on Member States individually. Thus there was a convergence in immobility in 
Washington and Brussels.  
 
In November 1998, the Commission made a proposal which included the definition of common 
positions and representation Community in the Fund. The European Councils of Vienna (1997) 
and Luxembourg (1998) preferred to engage in a pragmatic way, rather than moving towards the 
implementation of solutions based on the procedure of Article 111 §4. For the IMF, this 
amounted to the fact that the country administrator of the EU Presidency expresses the 
Community or euro area positions and that, if his country is not part of it, this position is 
expressed by another director of the Union or, if that State did not have a director, that said 
position be expressed by a member of his office. According to the European Council, the 
representative of the Presidency would associate a Commission official with his delegation, 
which was not accepted by the Fund. On the other hand, coordination between administrators 
from EU countries organized and the representative of the Commission in Washington and the 
IMF granted the ECB observer status entitling it to participate in the meetings of the Board of 
Directors for a meeting. We will add that the euro has been included in the basket constituting 
the SDR, the monetary unit of the Fund, and that the supervision exercised by it on the policies 
of the Member States takes into account the existence of the monetary union by the consideration 
given to the situation of the area as a whole and the role played by the Community authorities in 
the contacts made by the Fund in preparing the policy evaluation. 
 
There has been some progress on the community side. A coordination of positions was organized 
within the IMF subcommittee of the Economic and Financial Committee. This co-ordination, of 
which the former chair of the subcommittee himself writes that there was no commitment to 
reach an agreement, deals with issues strategic of which Willy Kiekens, Belgian administrator of 
the Fund, gives examples, and not on individual cases. On the other hand, coordination within 
the G7 also concerns the case of problem countries and it has been said that coordination within 
the G7 is often more extensive and more detailed than coordination between the countries of the 
Union. Even sometimes, the G7 "preempts European coordination" and Lorenzo Bini Smaghi to 
add "Euro area coordination usually reacts to MFIs and G7 agendas rather than the other way 
round". This is hardly disputable, that if the voice of the Union is expressed by several 
spokespersons, one will inevitably witness the expression of the desire to differentiate the 
messages except in cases where the common position is repeated at the risk of irritating partners 
who would be encouraged to push for a reduction in the number of mandates available. 
 
The President of the Euro group participates in the G7 Finance meetings and the President of the 
ECB replaces, for the examination of certain files, the governors of the national central banks of 
the three European states members of the G7 and the euro zone. The Commissioner responsible 
for EMU affairs does not have automatic access to the G7 Finance debates. The ECB is 
represented in the informal groups, of which one of the most significant examples is the so-called 
Basel Committee on Banking Regulation, where it plays an active role. It is easier for it to see its 
existence recognized in informal groups than to claim to be a member of mainstream 
international organizations. It should also be noted that the ECB became a member of the BIS by 
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subscribing to the capital of the Bank, which had, to accommodate it, modify its statutes by 
opening them to the membership of a transnational bank (Article 56 BIS Convention). 
 
During the work of the European Convention, the incantatory calls for the creation of a single 
flesh for the Union multiplied. The result is the insertion of Article III-196, contained in a section 
entitled "Provisions peculiar to the Member States whose currency is the euro". The relevant 
provision is paragraph 2, which provides that "the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, 
may adopt appropriate measures to ensure unified representation in international financial 
institutions and conferences". Since the Constitutional Treaty was put on the back burner, no 
significant contribution has been made, either by the Community institutions or by the European 
Council, as regards the representation of the Monetary Union or the European Union. Recently 
began work to restructure the IMF's shareholdings, which limited initially the situation to a 
limited number (four: China, South Korea), Turkey and Mexico), the reactions of some Member 
States and Central Banks in the Union have been defensive in the first place. While accepting the 
limited changes currently proposed for quota adjustments, the motto seemed to be: do not rush 
the status quo. Some added that a reform involving a constituency specific to the euro area (or 
the European Union) presupposed greater progress towards political union. In the response to the 
questionnaire preliminary to his appearance before the European Parliament before his 
appointment as a member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Jürgen Stark expressed this 
reluctance in these terms: "The present level of political integration restricts the development of 
common, convincing and inherently consistent positions for the euro countries. For that reason 
close coordination remains for the essential instrument for Developing common positions and for 
In measured terms, Bini Smaghi expresses the difficulty of the issues by writing: "... the role of 
the EU in a potential reform is not straightforward - from neither a global nor an internal 
European perspective - and requires far-reaching progress in political economic integration". 
 
A question which seems fundamental, is whether the European Union or the euro area would join 
the Fund. A second question, or a second group of questions, which is valid for the first as for the 
second hypothesis: would it be a substitution by the Union (the euro space) or a complementary 
participation of that of the Member States. Or again, would the Union (euro area) have to 
exercise the rights of its Member States? A third series of questions concerns seemingly 
technical modalities, but whose political impact is undeniable. How to determine the quotas and, 
consequently, the voting rights, of a set whose composition is likely to vary whether it is the euro 
zone or the Union itself? How to organize decision-making in the community sphere? In the 
event of failure to reach a common position, can one imagine a vote "disaggregated" according 
to the votes cast in the constituency Euro or European Union, or only the majority principle for 
the adoption of a common position within the constituent is it possible? Who would be the 
spokesperson for the Union (euro area) in the different organs of the Fund and how will it be 
(are) designated (s)? It is, in fact, difficult to distinguish between the first two groups of 
questions. 
 
For several authors who spoke in the 1990s, the IMF's participation in the Community, as such, 
was deemed within the exclusive competence because the members of the Fund, to participate in 
the Community, to a monetary union, were no longer, by the fact of its existence, in a position, to 
fulfill their obligations towards the Fund. The Community was henceforth the holder of these 
obligations (prohibition of multiple exchange rates, notification of the exchange rate regime, 
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availability of its currency ...) and the Monetary Fund had to recognize this reality that the text of 
the statutes, limiting the participation to the States, and their traditional interpretation had spread 
until then. To decide this question, it was necessary either to amend the statutes by the majority 
procedure of revision provided for by the statutes, or to give them an authentic interpretation 
according to the procedure of article XXIX of the statutes. The British opt-out, the Danish 
special status, and, a fortiori, the derogations being regarded as temporary, it was not necessary 
to be concerned with this phenomenon which necessarily temporary was the non-coincidence of 
the number of participants in the euro and that of the Member States of the European Union. 
Today, the possibility of participating in the monetary states union that have received or have 
granted (Sweden) an opt out being quite thin and the transition of states with the status of 
derogation appearing to have to be relatively long, the question arises. 
 
It must first be said in this respect that, in the case of so-called participation substitutive, since 
the EU or the euro area would replace their Member States in the membership of the Fund, it 
would clearly be the Community (or the Union), in the Constitutional Treaty regime) which 
would adhere, either by taking over the rights and obligations of all its Member States, or on 
behalf of the Member States that have adopted the euro, because the euro area does not have 
legal personality and the assumption that the ECB is the representative of the euro area within 
the IMF can be ruled out: the Bank (the Euro system) has internal monetary policy, but the 
exchange rate policy is shared, with a pre-eminence by the Treaty for the Council, and it is 
unclear political institutions Ignore the IMF and change the Treaty in this regard. 
 
Can one ask the question of EU participation as such in the IMF, on behalf of all its Member 
States, when some of its Member States have not adopted the euro? This would imply that the 
credential that underlies participation IMF would be different for ins and for outs. For the latter, 
the Union (the Community) could appear as the agent for monetary policy issues, remaining 
within the competence of the outs. But can the Fund, which is at the center of what Dominique 
Carreau and Patrick Juillard have called the public monetary system universal, be considered a 
monetary institution? It was created to form the institutional center of cooperation monetary, 
write Jean-Jacques Rey and Julie Detry. But, it is well known, the Fund, monetary and financial 
institution, also deals with the economic situation of its members. It supervises them by 
organizing examinations or consultations. It prepares biannually the "World Economic Outlook". 
These tasks are part of the Fund's action to maintain the stability of exchange rates and currency 
in general and the fight against the imbalances of payment balances. This action is thus focused 
on monetary and financial stability. It has been said that "the economic functions of the Fund are 
not very far reaching and subordinate to the monetary policy ones" and that "overall, the EC is 
definitely much better equipped with the necessary skills to effectively participate to the IMF 
than participant Member States”. However, as noted, the Fund itself sees its role as targeting the 
macroeconomic domain in general. Even focusing on the maintenance of monetary stability 
and financial, the Fund's observations envisage the economic policy general of its members.  
 
In view of the non-monetary aspects of the activity of the Fund, several authors have pointed out 
that in the case of competences shared between the Member States and the Community, or even 
for some of a specific category of competences, according to Article I- 15 of the Constitutional 
Treaty, participation in the IMF must necessarily be mixed, that is to say, be the responsibility of 
the of the IMF, common institutions and the Member States, because of the parallelism of the 
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external and internal powers which permeates the external action the Community. One must 
recognize both the weight of the argument and the problems of taking it into account. The 
precedents, sometimes highlighted, of joint representation of the whole formed by the 
Community and its Member States are not convincing because they do take not into account the 
specificity of the Fund. This is the situation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), of which the Member States, the Community and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) are shareholders. Each of these partners contributes its share of the 
capital of the Bank, which is deducted from the Community budget for the Community and 
calculated as a percentage of that capital. The participation of the Community is added to that of 
the Member States. In the case of the IMF, such an addition is not possible because the share of a 
member of the Fund results from taking into account economic factors (GDP, the degree of 
openness of economies) that the Community does not have its own, but as a result of the 
situation of its Member States. 
 
Another example is the experience of a non-financial institution: the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), whose Community has become a "member organization" alongside 
Member States of the Union that are "members" of FAO. Authors have proposed that the 
Community representative exercise the rights of the Community when its powers are at stake in a 
decision of a body of the Fund and that the Member States, having previously coordinated their 
views, would express the in other cases. The FAO precedent shows the difficulties of such a 
system. As for the IMF, it would be particularly disruptive. The board of directors of the Fund 
votes little. The division of the voting rights between the Community administrator and the 
Member States, in addition to the internal problems which it raises, would not fail to create 
difficulties for the proper functioning of the Fund's bodies. In addition, the goal of presenting a 
united front and speaking with one voice would not be achieved. This objective is important if 
Europe wants to exercise greater influence within the Fund, of which the steering Committee is 
currently the G7. It is a question of knowing if the Union wants in perpetuity to bow before the 
leadership of a global directory, whose composition no longer responds to the realities of the 
hour, and which is the lever of action of the superpower. More technically, based on the theory 
of coalitions, authors, including Bini Smaghi showed that the right to vote could be more or less 
extensive than the power exercised by the vote. In a system where majorities differ according to 
the importance given to a particular decision, similar considerations are of particular interest, 
whether to block a decision or to adopt one with the help of others.  
 
It is in this spirit that we could move towards a situation where the Community 'delegation' is the 
spokesperson for both its own positions and those of the Member States, as the case may be. As 
Smits wrote, "The Council's decision-making is 'tied' and should respect Member States 'external 
competences in the field of economic policies'. Indeed, the internal division of powers is 
irrelevant to other IMF members. The Court had once stated this in its 1/78 Decision concerning 
the supply rules and the Euratom security system. This common-sense doctrine is also the only 
one that makes it possible to reconcile the element of weakness which, externally vis-à-vis the 
partners, constitutes the essential principle of attribution of competences, on the one hand, and 
the need to have a coherent voice externally, on the other hand. This presupposes, of course, an 
effective coordination mechanism internally. In the report of a team of Bruegel, intended for the 
Finnish presidency, due to Alan Ahearne, Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and Nicolas Véron, 
entitled "The EU and the governance of globalization", it is also underlined that " External 
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influence requires efficient internal governance ". The authors of the Bruegel report indicate that 
their advocacy is not intended to advocate the federalisation of external representation and they 
pursue: "Member States can retain control through the definition of a mandate and the 
supervision of its implementation". And they repeat that "there is no sense in tending to more 
external influence but at the same time preventing it from being exercised because of internal the 
inability to make a decision". We believe that this possible mandate and control should be 
exercised within the institutional framework of the Union and that the continued participation of 
the Member States in the Fund's statutes could only be temporary. 
 
If such a system can resolve the question of the external exercise of internal competences 
variously divided between the Community and its Member States, can it be transposed to settle 
the issue of representation in the organs of the Fund of States which have not (again) adopted the 
euro? This is a purely political question. And it will probably be necessary, in this respect, to be 
content with formulas that allow the representation of maintained outs, either grouped or the 
United Kingdom alone, to be with the other states that have not yet adopted the euro in other 
constituents. This also raises the question of whether it is necessary to proceed in successive 
steps to the single chair or whether to try the big bang. A phased transition has been proposed 
that would consist in a remodeling of constituents based on participation in the Union. The 
model, to tell the truth, is not attractive. But it may be inevitable. One can only point out the 
issue in this article and note that this is a very delicate point of the necessary redevelopment. 
 
The pressure for change by emerging countries and the United States in this area must be taken 
into account in order to remedy the "overrepresentation" of the European Union and to allow 
greater openness to the countries of the world, emerging countries and developing countries. 
Member States of the European Union had 31.9% of the quotas (before the implementation of 
Singapore's decisions) and 7 of the 24 appointed or elected directors (which 6 of belonged to the 
euro area) within the board of directors. For its part, the United States had 17.14% of the quotas 
and 16.83% of the voting rights (that is to say, the possibility of blocking the adoption of the 
most important decisions) as well as a director designated. Important bargaining data concerning 
the location of the Fund's headquarters (in the country with the largest share according to Article 
XIII, Section 1 of the Bylaws) and the nomination procedure must also be kept in mind leaders 
of both the IMF and the World Bank according to the practice that the first is European and the 
second American. With regard to the first point, if the Union's participation were substitutable 
for that of its Member States, the assimilation with the situation of a State would be complete, 
Article XIII, Section 1 should then apply, except of course modification of the statutes. The 
abandonment of practices with respect to the allocation of mandates to the Fund and the World 
Bank is a matter of achieving better governance within these institutions and could be an element 
of the negotiation. 
 
In addition, any reform of the Fund is incomplete from the perspective of good governance if it is 
not as the composition of the G7, which are not based on a treaty, is theoretically easier to 
achieve. But the readjustment of quotas and voting rights, as well as the role and composition of 
the IMF's board of directors, depends on the future role of the Fund. The Governor of the Bank 
of England, Mervyn King, questioning the need for international monetary institution highlighted 
the forum function, analysis and arbitration of this institution in the context of an international 
economic system he sees as a "game" where there are players of different categories, each 
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adopting its own strategy. According to the author cited: The Fund requires an independent, 
respected and clear voice. The Chief Executive Officer of the Fund objected to the Fund's vision 
of limiting its role to that of an arbitrator, somehow foreign to the game, while aiming for a more 
active role for the organization, even if it also considers that surveillance, "The work - 
monitoring the global economy, advising individual members on their economies and assessing 
their policies ". And, at its meeting in Singapore September last, the IMF decided to create 
multilateral consultations, discussed in our introduction, which, as a first step, will focus on 
reducing current account imbalances while maintaining overall robust. growth. In other words, it 
is American-Asian trade imbalances. To quote again the Managing Director of the Fund, national 
policies will be discussed in the context of identifying an international public good. Observers 
welcomed this initiative, somewhat optimistically, as meaning "the end of G7 primacy". 
Furthermore, it is not reasonable to minimize the role the Fund can play not only in prevention 
but also in the solution of financial crises. The memories of the way was resolved the Asian 
crisis and the experience should not result in of the Fund this aspect of the Fund's activity being 
thrown overboard. It is not realistic, according to Edwin Truman, to think that the lending 
activity of the Fund could practically disappear even an increase in the activity of the institution 
in the next five years. 
 
It is understood that the composition and nature of Board the Fund are designed differently 
depending on the tasks entrusted to the institution. In any case, what is clear is that within the 
IMF, the problem of "chairs" and that of votes must be addressed simultaneously as Edwin 
Truman and that the United States has an opportunity to block the continuation of the board at 24 
by opposing the decision on this point (which requires a majority of 85%) to return to the 
number of 20 directors (5 nominated and 19 elected representatives) provided for in the statutes. 
Some authors have pointed out that the adjustment of quotas is not only a question of equity, but 
also a question of legitimacy of the Fund allowing the feeling of belonging (ownership) on the 
part of its members. This is particularly the case in the report Bruegel for the Finnish presidency 
(cited above) which also emphasizes that "pressure is for redistribution of power" and warns of 
the drawbacks of delay by Europeans, because of that the share of our continent in the world 
GDP decreases. "The more the adjustment is delayed, the less economic and political weight will 
be reduced to a satisfactory arrangement". This necessarily entails sacrifices on the part of the 
Europeans because the weight of intra-Community trade must be subtracted from the calculation 
of the common share and, as has been indicated, the change in the composition of the 
constituents may undermine the nature cooperative of the Fund, which was expressed by the fact 
that both the creditor and the debtor States were obliged to collaborate within the same 
constituency. The redistribution of the cards will lead necessarily to a profound transformation 
on this point.  
 
The result in itself would be more strongly opposed between the categories of Member States 
involved. Observers have noted that the issue of a single "chair" was not discussed in Singapore. 
The debate focuses on the criteria to be taken into account for the adjustment of quotas. The 
composition of the board of directors is also an important element of reflection. Although it is a 
question of ensuring its representativeness of the international community, some warn that if the 
influence shifts from the creditor States to the debtor States, large States might lose interest in 
the Fund. As indicated in Singapore, the Fund's Managing Director: "Ownership is essential not 
only in the country but fundamentals of the Fund ". New balances are to be put in place. In any 
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event, as has been pointed out by Christoph Hermann, in the absence of Community participation 
(euro area) as such, the Member States must act as trustees of the interest common, as does the 
Court of Justice has indicated with regard to the International Labor Organization, to which only 
the Member States participate while the area of activity of that organization falls, at least 
partially, within the exclusive competence of the Community. This means, in particular, that 
positions need to be adopted common.  
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